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Abstract 
 
The introduction of performance-related pay with Performance Management in the state 
school sector of England and Wales represents a considerable change in the school 
management system. After 2000, all teachers were subject to annual goal setting performance 
reviews. Experienced teachers were offered an extended pay scale based on performance 
instead of seniority, and to gain access to the new upper pay scale, teachers had to go through 
a ‘threshold assessment’ based on their professional skills and performance. This paper 
reports the results of a panel survey of classroom and head teachers which started in 2000 just 
before implementation of the new system, and then after one and after four years of operation. 
We find that both classroom and head teacher views have changed considerably over time, 
from initial general skepticism and opposition towards a more positive view, especially 
among head teachers by 2004. We argue that the adoption of an integrative bargaining 
approach to performance reviews explains why a growing minority of schools have achieved 
improved goal setting, and improved pupil attainments as they have implemented 
performance management. Pay for performance has been one of the measures of 
organizational support that head teachers could bring to induce changes in teachers’ 
classroom priorities. We argue that the teachers’ case shows that a wider range of 
performance incentives than previously thought can be offered to employees in such 
occupations, provided that goal setting and performance measurement are approached as a 
form of negotiation instead of top-down. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In theory, school teachers should be among the least suitable groups for linking pay to 
performance. Nevertheless, despite strong initial opposition among teachers and their unions, 
and equally strong scepticism from academic economists (eg. Richardson 1999, Dolton et al. 
2003), the pay for performance system for school teachers in England and Wales, introduced 
in 2000, appears to be gaining acceptance among teachers. In schools where it is practiced 
systematically, there is evidence that it is leading to improved goal setting, and to faster 
improvements in pupil performance than in other schools. This article seeks to explain how 
this came about. In doing so, it argues that we need to broaden current theories linking pay to 
performance, and consider the way performance is defined, through goal-setting and the 
potential element of individual negotiation in this process. 
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One of the key limitations of existing theory is that it has focused on a narrow range of types 
of output-based pay, such as for semi-skilled workers, sales staff and senior managers, where 
performance is more easily measured. In his Journal of Economic Literature review of current 
research on the subject, Prendergast (1999) urged us to look beyond such groups for a wider 
understanding of pay and incentives for other kinds of employees. In contrast to the former 
occupations, and like many other public service workers, school teachers, of whom there are 
nearly half a million in the UK, have proved a challenge for motivation by conventional forms 
of pay for performance. The nature of their work is ‘imprecise’. It does not comprise a set of 
well-defined techniques that have to be consistently applied, and there is, at best, a loose 
relationship between particular actions and their students’ learning (Murnane and Cohen, 
1986). In this respect, their work could be said to differ fundamentally from that which has 
provided the strongest demonstrations of how output-based pay can boost performance, such 
as Lazear’s windshield replacers at Safelite (Lazear 1996). Not only is their work ‘imprecise’, 
but frequently it involves a range of different kinds of activities, some of which are more 
amenable to measurement than others, for example, students’ national test results versus 
educating future citizens. Their work often involves a great degree of interdependency. Even 
if one can isolate an individual teacher’s classroom contribution, which many teachers believe 
improbable, there remain important areas of team-work within schools (Dolton et al 2003). 
Moreover, the presence of a ‘collegiate ethos’ (Adnett, 2003) diminishes the likelihood that 
teachers will ‘shirk’ because their effort is hard to measure, and so reduces the relevance of 
one common argument for tying pay to performance. 
 
Thus if we were to stick with the conventional forms of output based pay, which as 
Prendergast notes, have been analysed extensively within Personnel Economics, we should 
expect to find few successful examples of pay for performance in schools. This was indeed 
the case until fairly recently. Despite a proliferation of schemes in the US in the early 
twentieth century (Murnane and Cohen,1986), and a long-running scheme in England in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century (Dolton et al., 2003), pay for performance virtually 
disappeared from school teaching in both countries for most of the twentieth century. 
Teaching in schools was barren ground for any kind of payment by results, even in private 
schools (Murnane and Cohen 1986). Theory and practice seemed to agree, and the affair was 
closed. 
 
Nevertheless, some characteristics of teachers’ work have meant that the issue never quite 
disappeared, and in recent years, it has undergone a revival in the US in a number of school 
districts with performance pay schemes, in Israel (Lavy, 1999) and in Japan
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. It has done so 
most dramatically in Britain, where a national scheme, ‘Performance Management’, was 
introduced in 2000 in state primary and secondary schools in England and Wales, the subject 
of this paper. 
 
The reasons for the sustained interest are easy to understand. It is widely accepted that there 
are considerable variations in teacher effectiveness, a point touched on in the British 
government’s recent teacher recruitment campaign ‘everyone remembers a good teacher’3, 
and widely acknowledged by both classroom and head teachers in the first wave of the survey 
on which this article is based (Marsden, 2000). Governments have also retained an interest for 
budgetary reasons. Faced with a need to raise educational standards, and tight restrictions on 
public spending increases, several national governments have sought to use pay systems more 
actively as an instrument to achieve these ends. Notwithstanding the academic arguments 
against performance pay, many educational practitioners have observed the extent to which 
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existing pay rules were manipulated in order to recruit and retain, and the perverse effects of 
paying teachers for management activities in order to enhance their pay. It was widely felt too 
that the then existing salary system was failing to motivate teachers because so many (about 
60%) were stuck on the top pay grade, and was encouraging them to take on additional non-
teaching duties for more pay which diverted them from the classroom, and so made raising 
standards even harder to achieve. There was also a feeling in British government circles that 
even though teachers work very long hours during term time, and experience a strong 
professional ethos, there were few financial inducements to encourage them to accept the 
changes in work priorities sought by the government. 
2. The teachers’ performance pay and performance management system 
The performance management system for state school teachers, introduced by the government 
in 2000, sought to address the need to reward teachers better for excellence in the classroom. 
Performance management (PM) sought to combine goal-setting and appraisal with 
performance pay, thus extending the growing practice of other parts of the British public 
services. It made annual salary progression dependent on performance. The new pay scale 
comprised two parts. For the lower part, which was, roughly speaking, the old main pay scale, 
the annual seniority increments were retained, covering roughly the first few years of a 
teacher’s career. Progression to the new ‘upper pay scale’ required passing the ‘threshold 
assessment’, based partly on teachers’ professional development, and partly on the progress of 
their pupils. Progression along the upper scale was based entirely on performance. There was 
also provision for accelerated increments for high performers along the lower part of the 
scale. The associated financial rewards could be considerable, potentially taking teachers to 
earnings to 25% above the top of the lower scale, where about 60% of teachers had been 
clustered in 2000. Unlike some private sector bonus systems, the teachers’ performance-
related increments are permanent and count for their pensions. In exchange for the new 
structure of rewards, all teachers were required to have an annual performance review to set 
goals and appraise performance, including those on the lower part of the new pay scale. 
 
The most controversial element of the new performance system has been the concept that 
performance should include an element of pupil progress. On the whole, teachers, and their 
unions, have been receptive to rewards for improved inputs, such as for improved skills. 
However, pupil progress relates to their outputs, and this caused widespread opposition, with 
the largest of the teachers’ unions opposing it on the grounds that it amounted to payment-by-
results. The other unions, which were more supportive of performance review, were also 
strongly opposed to any form of payment-by-results, and were deeply suspicious that in some 
schools, head teachers would implement this part of the new scheme in a mechanistic fashion. 
Although the Education Department provided many ‘good practice’ illustrations of how pupil 
progress could applied in a constructive fashion, there was widespread suspicion among 
teachers at the outset that the scheme was really about using performance pay in order to save 
money and restrict pay increases to those who toed the line. As will be seen, our study shows 
that this perception declined over time, but has nevertheless remained a significant under-
current among teachers. 
 
To assist implementation, on its website, the Education Department provided schools with 
numerous examples of good practice concerning how pupil progress could be integrated into 
performance reviews. Many of these illustrate a problem-solving approach to goal-setting and 
appraisal. One example, which is discussed later in this article, shows the objective setting 
part of the review involved a joint analysis of strategies to tackle a student learning problem, 
how to improve attainments of boys in a particular subject, and agreement to implement them 
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during the year. The next review in the cycle would then assess how successful 
implementation had been, and the contribution of these strategies to the school’s own goals.  
 
Despite such positive examples, many teachers, and their unions, feared that practice in 
schools would be rather different. It was feared that pressures on head teachers to raise their 
school’s academic performance would lead to payment-by-exam-results. One such pressure, 
which we explored was that of educational ‘league tables’. As a result of changes in funding 
arrangements and the devolution of greater management autonomy, schools now have to 
compete to attract pupils who bring funding. Schools which fail to do so, will experience 
falling numbers and income, and may eventually be closed. A crucial signal to parents in this 
quasi market is provided by comparative tables, league tables, displaying each school’s 
national exam results. These are publicly available on the Education Department’s website, 
and are frequently published in local newspapers so that parents know which schools are 
getting more pupils through their exams, and can benchmark them against local and national 
standards. 
 
A second aspect of diversity among schools in the implementation of performance 
management was suggested to us in an interview with the former head of Cambridge 
Educational Associates,
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 the organisation responsible for monitoring implementation of the 
threshold. From early on, it seemed that some schools had approached performance 
management as a means of improving how schools are run, to achieve better coordination 
between teachers’ activity in the classroom and the school’s wider objectives. In contrast, 
initially at least, the majority of schools were using the new scheme as a means of getting 
what was felt to be a long overdue pay increase for teachers, and which should ease staff 
retention problems, especially in high living cost areas such as London. Later on, we 
characterise these two strategies as ‘reformer’ and ‘firefighter’. This diversity of strategies 
will make it possible later on to test the effects of the scheme on pupil performance outcomes. 
 
3. The analytical approach: performance management as ‘integrative’ negotiation 
The examples of good practice performance reviews provided by the Education Department 
include a special feature that is under-developed in the discussions of agency, expectancy, and 
goal-setting theory: namely a view of goal setting as a problem-solving process. That problem 
is how to align individual employees’ work goals with the changing goals of their 
organisation. In professional work, management is dependent on the knowledge and expertise 
of their staff in order to define appropriate performance goals, and especially, to identify the 
steps necessary for their achievement. There needs therefore to be an exchange of information 
both about objectives, to ensure these are realistic, and about the means to reach them. The 
nature of this asymmetry is illustrated from a study by the government’s school inspectorate, 
which quoted one teacher from a school with a good appraisal system which included an 
element of classroom observation: 
 
‘My classroom observation (by the head) was useless. For one thing he only came 
once, and there was no proper feedback. The head was completely out of touch with 
recent developments in modern language teaching, and so unable to engage in the type 
of debate I hoped for’ (Ofsted, 1996 §15). 
 
The appraiser in this case lacked knowledge of both the subject and its teaching methods, and 
would be hard put to ‘cascade’ objectives top down, and hope that they would be successfully 
implemented. There may also be disagreements about the goals that constitute performance. 
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To what extent should the teacher prioritise exam passes versus developing an understanding 
of, and an affection for, the language being taught, and there might need to be compromise 
from both sides in order to sustain commitment to agreed goals. 
 
One framework for thinking about such processes is provided by what Walton and McKersie 
(1965) describe as ‘integrative’ bargaining, or negotiation. However, in this case, it would 
take place at an individual rather than a collective level, between individual teachers and their 
line managers. According to these authors, we should distinguish ‘integrative’ from 
‘distributive’ bargaining, the latter being about shares of the pie, and the former about 
problem-solving in order to achieve a larger pie. They present four stages or components of 
integrative bargaining: identifying the problem; searching for alternative solutions; selecting 
the best alternative; and commitment to implementation. Whereas the first two may seem 
relatively technical, the third, selection, involves also reference to the preferences of the two 
parties, or as the two authors stress, to their utility functions. The final component brings us 
back to issues of re-contracting and commitment to deliver by both parties. Thus, if 
performance management is to be seen as involving a significant element of integrative 
bargaining, then one would expect it to show evidence of these components, which will be 
explored in the empirical part of the paper. However, before that, it is helpful to compare the 
integrative bargaining approach with other theoretical approaches to the analysis of incentives 
and performance appraisal. 
 
Several elements of the process of integrative bargaining are recognised individually by the 
other main theories in the area, but they are not treated together. In discussing the optimal 
design of incentives, agency theory deals extensively with issues of monitoring performance, 
and gaining agreement to a mutually satisfactory design of incentives, otherwise the job offer 
will be rejected. Mostly, the emphasis has been on new hires rather than on negotiation with 
incumbent employees (Prendergast 1999, Tzioumis 2005). Agency theory has also looked at 
issues of renegotiation, particularly in relation to pay when firms are faced with changes in 
market conditions, and it has dealt with the problems of ‘hold-ups’ in such relationships, 
whereby one party threatens to end the relationship in order to force the other to make large 
concessions (Gibbons 1998, Malcomson, 1997, Teulings and Hartog, 1998). However, their 
emphasis has been very much upon distributive rather than integrative bargaining, on 
changing rewards rather than adapting elements of performance. 
 
The psychological theory of goal setting, as recently reviewed by Locke and Latham (2002), 
has recognised that participative goal-setting, with an input from employees, often leads to 
better results, although the emphasis, as Locke and Latham (2002) observe, has been 
primarily on information exchange, and to a lesser extent on goal commitment. Expectancy 
theory emphasises the social exchange between managers and staff, and the need for 
perceived good faith from management in the operation of performance evaluations on which 
performance pay depends, but on the whole, management are left to determine the nature of 
the nature of performance and its link with rewards (Furnham, 1997). A third strand of 
psychological theories does consider problems of contracting and breach of perceived 
agreement, namely, ‘psychological contract’ theory (Rousseau, 1995). For sound 
methodological reasons, Rousseau rejects the idea that organisations can be party to 
psychological contracts: organisations are not psychological entities. 
 
An integrative negotiation approach draws on elements of these theories by offering a 
stronger focus on adapting the content and priorities of work performance to changing needs 
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of the principal, in the light of the expertise and the preferences of the agent, and on the need 
to advance by mutual consent on the basis of give and take by both sides. 
 
The next section of the paper presents the empirical results. The panel results document the 
change from initial hostility to performance management among classroom teachers, and also 
many head teachers, towards declining scepticism about its value among teachers and an 
increasing belief in its usefulness among school heads. It then looks at performance 
management and head teacher views on its contribution towards improved school 
management, and argues, on the basis of survey replies, that it functions in many schools as 
form of integrative negotiation between school management and classroom teachers. The 
article then seeks to provide rough estimates of the proportion of schools in the sample which 
could be said to practice integrative negotiation systematically in performance management, 
and to show that in these schools, pupil attainments in national tests have increased more than 
in other schools. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 The nature of the survey 
The primary data source for this study is a panel questionnaire survey of classroom and head 
teachers in the same schools conducted at intervals between 2000 and 2004 by the Centre for 
Economic Performance, and based on a random sample of state schools in England and 
Wales
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. It has been carried out in close consultation with the teachers’ unions and 
professional organisations and the Education Department. Nevertheless, it is an independent 
study. The panel has now completed three waves: the first in February-March 2000, before 
the new scheme was implemented (see Marsden, 2000); the second in May-June 2001, after 
the first round of ‘threshold’ results were known; and the third in May-June 2004, after the 
results of the fourth round of the system, including potential progression to point 3 on the new 
upper pay scale. For classroom teachers, the questionnaire probes their attitudes and 
experiences in relation to performance management, and seeks to measure aspects of their 
work patterns and priorities alongside other variables such as their degree of organisational 
commitment and their assessment of the working atmosphere in their schools. A copy of the 
questionnaire used in the first wave can be found in Marsden (2000). For head teachers, it 
asks also about the operation of performance management in their schools, and whether they 
believe it has assisted them in their management duties. In addition to the ‘before and after’ 
element of the panel, it is possible to link replies from classroom teachers with those of their 
head teachers, and with other information on their schools concerning the impact of 
performance management on work patterns, and some educational outcomes based on 
Education Department’s school performance data. Initially, the panel included replies from 
about 4,000 teachers and about 1,000 heads. Accounting for sample attrition, it is possible to 
link replies from about 1,000 teachers and about 300 heads over time through the panel. We 
conducted a number of checks to see whether the panel results reported here differ statistically 
significantly from the simple cross-section results for each wave, and found that on the whole 
they do not. In combining all these different types of information, this study goes much 
further than previous UK public service studies, such as those reviewed in the government’s 
Makinson Report (2000), by tracking the same individuals over time, and by combining 
multiple points of observation and types of data. These studies, which led Makinson to 
conclude that the schemes practised in the British public services were not working, gave no 
indication as to how employee attitudes changed over time, and lacked independent data on 
performance outcomes, weaknesses the present study has been designed to overcome. 
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4.2 From initial hostility to increasing acceptance of performance management: 2000-
2004. 
As one would expect from the earlier discussion, at the start, teachers were more sceptical of 
the principle of linking pay to performance and its feasibility in their area of work than other 
public service employees (see Marsden and French 1998). This is reflected in the first wave 
responses of both classroom and head teachers in 2000 (see Table 1 below). Initially only a 
fifth of classroom teachers and a third of heads agreed with the principle of linking teachers’ 
pay to performance, with comparably low percentages of both groups thinking it could lead to 
a fairer allocation of pay, or that it was fair to link pay to pupil progress. Yet, over time, there 
have been significant increases in support for these views, roughly doubling over the duration 
of the panel. It should be emphasised that these are balanced panel results, tracking 
individuals who replied to all three waves, and so represent changes of opinion by individual 
teachers. By 2004, between half and two-thirds of heads, and between one and two fifths of 
classroom teachers had come to accept these principles. 
 
There have also been equally significant changes in teachers’ beliefs about the 
appropriateness of performance management to teachers’ work. Initially, 90% of classroom 
and 80% of head teachers considered that PM was inappropriate because one could not relate 
the work done in schools to the performance of individual teachers, a point echoed by the 
economist critics of the scheme (eg Richardson, 1999, Dolton et al 2003). By 2004, this had 
dropped to 75% among classroom teachers, and to only 44% among school heads. Likewise, 
at the outset over a third of heads thought teachers had too little autonomy in their jobs to be 
able to vary their performance, but this had fallen to under 10% by 2004. Among classroom 
teachers, fears that managers would use PM to reward their favourites, a deep rooted problem 
in other British public sector performance pay schemes, had fallen away from over half in 
2000 to less than a fifth by 2004. Thus, even though many teachers maintained their 
opposition to PM, substantial numbers had changed their assessment of it by 2004. 
 
Closely related to these changes in teachers’ attitudes appears to be the growing perception 
that goal setting has been working better than initially expected, as 60% of classroom teachers 
and 80% of heads report that management now sets targets more clearly, and among 
secondary schools in particular, 40% of classroom teachers and 70% of heads say that PM is 
now used as a means to make staff better informed about objectives within the school. By 
2004, nearly 40% of teachers reported that PM had made them personally more aware of their 
school’s objectives, the increase being particularly strong in secondary schools. Another 
significant change has been the increased perception that PM provides organisational support 
to teachers, helping to identify their professional needs, up from 25% to over 40% between 
2001 and 2004 among class teachers, and up to over 60% among head teachers by 2004. 
Among head teachers, there has also been modest growth to 45% in 2004 of those who 
believe that PM has encouraged teachers to focus on pupil attainments. 
 
Nevertheless, the salience of pay has remained strong, and it lends some support to the 
position of the largest teachers’ union, the National Union of Teachers, that PM is primarily 
about paying teachers for results, especially in the sense that it represents what its members 
believe to be the underlying reality of the scheme. In the first wave, two thirds of classroom 
teachers thought the scheme was ‘simply a device to avoid giving a pay rise to all teachers’, 
and even after four years of operation, about half of them still believed the scheme was 
basically about getting more work done. Despite the subsequent evidence of high pass rates, a 
very high percentage of teachers, and a substantial number of heads, doubt the government’s 
commitment to continued funding of performance increases, and fear that they will become 
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very selective if constrained by school budgets. Initially, and again in 2004, around 80% of 
classroom teachers believed school budgets would impose a quota on performance pay 
increases, and even after four years of operation, just under half of all head teachers believed 
the same. Thus although the unions have pressed hard to ensure that an absolute standard of 
performance is applied, most teachers believe that budgetary considerations force PM to focus 
on relative performance, and restrict rewards to the best performers. 
 
Apart from who gets incentive pay, there is also the question of how far teachers value the 
size of rewards offered. Although there seems to be a stable group of about one third who 
believe the new salary levels are too small to make them want to work harder, there has been 
a growing minority who disagree, and find the rewards attractive: up from 15% in 2000 to 
nearly 30% in 2004. Thus although other surveys have shown that teachers are not strongly 
motivated by financial incentives, pay being more a source of discontent than of positive 
motivation (Vaarlem at al 1992), there is clearly a group of teachers within the sample who 
have found the new pay scales attractive. An important category among these appears to be 
new entrant teachers who value the long term prospect of earnings on the extended pay scale 
(Marsden 2000). Finally, a key question for the interpretation of PM in schools is how far 
teachers believe it is operated primarily as a means to ensure teachers get their pay increase. 
This perception was much stronger among classroom than among head teachers, with around 
four fifths of classroom teachers holding this view in 2004, but only half of head teachers 
doing so. This suggests that classroom teachers are keenly aware of the link between 
increased pay and their performance reviews. Although success rates at both the Threshold 
assessment and upper pay scale progression were extremely high between 2000 and 2004, at 
over 90%, these were known ex post. Ex ante, the results show both a strong consciousness 
that pay increases require success in the review process, and continuing uncertainty as to 
whether pass rates will, in practice, be determined by absolute criteria, comparable to a 
‘driving test’ as one teachers’ union official described it, or whether they will be constrained 
by a quota or budgetary restrictions. A good measure of the uncertainty in teachers’ minds 
about the selective nature of the progression linked to performance is shown by their 
responses between waves to the question about whether performance awards are subject to a 
quota. The second wave took place in spring 2001, just after teachers had been informed of 
the results of the first round of Threshold assessments. There was a sharp fall, from over 80% 
to less than 30%, in the percentage thinking restrictions would be applied to the number of 
successful applications. However, that percentage bounced back to 80% in the third wave. 
The reason for this, suggested to us when presenting preliminary results to the teachers’ 
unions, was that the Education Department had floated proposals shortly before the third 
wave that the money available would be capped so that future increases would be constrained 
by school budgets. On that occasion the proposals were withdrawn, but the continued 
uncertainty has meant that teachers believe the scheme has real teeth. Indeed, there was a 
long-running tension between the government, whose policy is that the scheme should be 
selective, and the unions, which have sought to minimise selectivity.
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The head teacher judgements are noteworthy for the decline in numbers who think of PM 
primarily as a means to get pay increases for their teachers. This was especially true in 
secondary schools which have more developed management systems than primary schools. 
This would be consistent with an increased emphasis on using PM as a means of improving 
goal setting within schools noted earlier on, and is consistent with the point to be developed 
later on, that the number of schools using PM to reform school management has been 
growing. 
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Thus, the first impression from these results is that the predicted failure of performance 
reviews and performance pay in schools has not occurred, and that by 2004, there was every 
sign that it was taking root in schools, providing more motivating rewards for a significant 
number of teachers. Most important, the procedures for defining the kinds of performance that 
management wanted to achieve were proving moderately effective: goal setting was believed 
to have improved, teachers felt management was providing some support to them as a result 
of PM, and there was an increased awareness of the priority to be given to pupil attainments. 
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Table 1. Classroom teachers’ judgements of Performance Management: before and 
after implementation (Balanced panel results) 
Abbreviated questions Class  
teachers 
   Head  
teachers 
   
 Wave 1 Wave2 Wave3 Change Wave 1 Wave2 Wave3 Change  
 % agree % 
agree 
% 
agree 
 % agree % 
agree 
% 
agree 
 
Acceptance of the basic 
principles of PM 
        
The principle of relating 
teachers' pay to performance 
is a good one. 
23 29 37 *** 34 37 50 * 
PM will lead to a fairer 
allocation of pay 
6 13 19 *** 28 45 63 + 
Fair to reward for pupil 
progress  
22 22 37 *** 25 45 57 ** 
         
Appropriateness of PM to 
teachers’ work 
        
Hard to relate the work done 
in schools to individual 
performance 
89 83 75 *** 83 69 44 *** 
Teachers have too little 
autonomy  
    36 30 9 *** 
Managers will reward 
favourites 
54 43 19 *** - - -  
PM causes jealousies  88 60 37 *** 81 50 29 *** 
         
Improved goal setting by 
PM 
        
Targets set more clearly - 42 60 *** 52 84 82 *** 
Made me more aware of my 
school’s targets 
- 32 37  - - - - 
(Secondary schools only) - 22 35 *** - - - - 
More incentive to focus on 
pupil attainments  
- - - - 40 38 45 Ns 
Used as a means to make staff 
better informed about 
objectives within the school  
- 16 31 *** Na 33 41 Ns 
(Secondary schools only) - 15 37 *** - 44 70 *** 
         
Organisational support 
through PM 
        
Used to help better identify 
teachers’ professional 
development needs. 
- 25 43 *** - 54 63 Ns 
(Secondary schools only) - - -  - 61 74 Ns 
         
Incentives offered by PM         
Salary levels > Threshold are 
too low to make me want to 
work harder   (% agree) 
33 35 33 *** - - - - 
“    “    “     ( % disagree) 15 25 28 *** - - - - 
PM simply a device to get 
more work done 
58 58 49 ** - - -  
(Secondary schools only) 66 65 56 *** - - - - 
There is a budgetary quota on 
Threshold and UPS pay 
increases 
82 28 79 *** - - -  
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PM helped to ensure teachers 
in your school get their pay 
increase  
- 81 76 Ns - 72 55 ns 
(Secondary schools only) - 79 82 Ns - 64 46 *** 
Change over time significant at: *** <1%; ** <2%; * <5%; + <10%. Ns: not statistically significant 
Number of balanced panel observations: class teachers: c 2300; head teachers: c 100 for most questions. 
Note: Results are based on the balanced panel, that is those replying in each of the three waves. The results of the 
balanced panel mostly differ only slightly from those of the three cross-sections. Scores in the table are weighted 
by sample fractions (smplwt).  
 
4.3 Performance review in schools as ‘integrative negotiation’ 
Clues as to the reasons for the moderate success of PM by 2004 can be found by looking more 
closely at the process of performance review that lies at the heart of PM. This section explores 
evidence that, in the best cases, performance reviews have functioned as a form of integrative 
negotiation of teachers’ work objectives, and notably in the ‘reformer’ schools. It does so by 
considering in turn each of the four stages of integrative bargaining identified by Walton and 
McKersie. 
a) Identifying the problem 
In the first stage of integrative negotiation, the two parties have to identify the problem which 
brings together the priorities of the organisation and the capacities and orientations of its 
members. In the case of performance review, this means relating the contribution of 
individual teachers to the wider objectives of the school and their adaptation to new 
circumstances. 
 
From the management side, in recent years, schools have come under a large number of 
external pressures which have made their comparative performance with other schools a key 
concern. This information is easily available to parents of potential pupils, and with the 
funding changes that attach school funding to pupils, schools compete in a ‘quasi market’ 
(Glennerster, 2002). The Education Department also benchmarks school performance, and 
there is also richer and more qualitative information available to all online from government 
inspectors (Ofsted). Within schools, this pressure has become symbolised by the educational 
league tables of local schools based on comparative academic performance at national tests. 
To capture this element of pressure on head teachers, we enquired about the influence of 
league tables on their schools in the third wave. In that, 60% of heads reported increased 
parental pressure as a result of educational league tables. We also enquired about the methods 
used to produce better academic performance in their schools, and notably, whether schools 
sought to learn about educational practices used at comparable schools scoring strongly in 
school league tables. Fifty percent of teachers, and sixty percent of heads, replied that their 
schools did so. Heads were also asked whether they had shifted resources in response to 
league table performance issues: 60% reported greater academic content in courses covered 
by tests; 41% that significant resources were devoted to teaching test skills; and 30% reported 
more resources being provided to test subjects, such as maths, at the expense of other 
subjects. Thus the mixture of benchmarking and quasi market had generated pressure on 
heads to change priorities and shift resources in their schools. Most schools use a range of 
decision-making methods to address such issues, but the performance review has a special 
place because it provides an opportunity for individual-level discussions about individual 
work objectives and how to relate them to school objectives. 
 
The results of our survey indicate that classroom teachers enter this process with different 
priorities, which have also been taken up by their unions. For example, when questioned 
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about the reasons for the way they allocated their discretionary working time between 
different activities, many teachers emphasised their desire to give a ‘high quality of 
education’ as the most important reason, particularly for such activities as lesson preparation 
and feedback. It can also be found in some of the written-in comments. As one classroom 
teacher put it: the new system is based on a ‘narrow perception of education as measured by 
attainment, whereas schools are also about learning to be members of a community’7. Indeed, 
some heads expressed similar views in their own written-in comments, but it was their job to 
make the new system work. Thus performance management can be seen as involving a 
process of problem identification from two sides, which are not necessarily in opposition to 
one another, but they do have distinct points of view which will need to be reconciled. 
 
The effectiveness of this process is revealed by the growth in the share of both head teachers 
and team leaders
8
 who believed that PM had made teachers more aware of school objectives, 
both around 60% by wave 3, and had make teachers think more systematically about their 
work priorities, both around 50% by wave 3 (Table 2). Many also thought that it had 
increased the importance of good middle-management in their schools. Given the difficulty 
for head teachers to be acquainted with the detail of their colleagues’ work except in small 
schools, and their inevitable reliance on this intermediate management level, this suggests that 
in many cases PM has raised awareness of the need to strengthen the linkage between 
different levels of management within schools. 
 
 
Table 2. Contribution of performance management to improved goal setting in 
schools: Head teachers’ and team-leaders’ views (balanced panel) 
Performance management has: Wave Head Teachers 
Agree % 
 
Team leaders 
Agree % 
made more teachers aware of the school’s 
objectives in the School Improvement Plan  2 41 
 
47 
 3 57** 65* 
    
made teachers think more systematically about their 
work priorities  2 39 
 
37 
 3 54* 50* 
    
increased the importance of good middle  
management.  2 55 
 
45 
 3 60 42 
Note: sample numbers in the balanced panel are 104, and in the cross section about 420 and 290 respectively in 
waves 2 and 3. Changes between waves are statistically significant (Chi2 prob <=1%) for  questions 1 and 4, 
significant at the 5% level for priorities, and not significant for middle management. Similar differences between 
the waves are shown in the comparison of cross-section data, but significance levels are higher, except for 
middle management owing to the larger number of observations. 
Statistical significance of change between Waves 2 and 3: ** 1%; * 5%.  Results weighted by sample fractions. 
 
b) Searching for alternative solutions 
The second stage of integrative negotiation involves identifying strategies for solution, and 
how to implement them, including support given to teachers by their schools. The survey did 
not probe directly the search for alternative solutions, but when considered with other sources, 
there is indirect evidence that this occurs in the best cases. A first source is the good practice 
case study material provided by the Education Department at the outset, which drew on 
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existing practice in some schools, and sought to show others how PM could be used (see Box 
1 below). The spirit of these is to suggest open enquiry in the search for solutions rather than 
a strict top-down approach. The Education Department’s guidance stated:  
 
‘Objectives would typically emerge from a discussion between team leaders and 
individual teachers about the priorities for the coming year and the particular ways in 
which the teacher can help the pupils he or she teaches. This might involve targeting 
the progress of a group of pupils which is not meeting expectations or a small number 
of named pupils. Or it might be a priority to implement new policies or develop 
approaches or techniques which will help pupils to progress e.g. better classroom 
management skills.’ DfEE (1999, p.10) 
 
Thus, having identified a problem, the two parties work together to devise a strategy to tackle 
it. The same spirit was illustrated in a number of case studies included in the same document, 
and which fleshed out these general principles. 
 
Box 1: Objective Relating to Pupil Performance: Class Teacher (Year 5) 
 
Background: Evaluation of optional Year 4 test data and the Year 4 teacher’s own 
assessments shows a clear gender gap in attainment in English and a weakness across the 
class in writing. In the judgement of the Year 4 teacher, by the end of the year about 60% of 
children in the class were not able to do all that the Literacy Framework expects. In his view 
about 70% of boys fell into this category as opposed to 50% of girls. 
The objective: by the end of Year 5, to increase substantially the percentage of the class as a 
whole that will be able to do almost all of what the Literacy Framework states that they 
should be taught over the year, in writing as well as reading, and to reduce the gender gap 
from the present 20%. 
In discussion: the teacher and team leader might discuss the importance of remedying 
identified weaknesses in children’s knowledge of spelling conventions, sentence construction 
and punctuation, and teaching strategies known to be helpful for boys such as clear short term 
targets or use of non-fiction writing exercises. The review meeting would discuss the 
outcomes achieved by the children and review comparative achievement by boys and girls. 
 
Source: DfEE (1999). 
 
Other examples provided by the Education Department include the provision of support to 
teachers to enable the objectives to be achieved, most notably, further professional 
development to provide additional skills where needed, but they also included other types of 
support, as identified in the objective setting process. 
 
An important part of the search for alternative solutions involves consideration of the means 
required for their implementation. Management controls many of these resources, so it is to 
the head teachers’ replies that one has to turn for evidence of this (Table 3). The questions 
that comprise the table reflect the factors identified by heads in the first wave as potential 
causes of variations in the effectiveness of experienced teachers in their schools, and therefore 
which are likely to be addressed in the development of new strategies for the school. Thus, we 
asked heads whether PM had enabled them to address some of these problem factors. By 
wave 3, benefits were identified in a substantial minority of cases, between 20 and 35%, the 
most important being assistance in identifying teachers’ professional development needs, and 
workload problems. There was a notable increase between the second and third waves for 
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some issues. By 2004, 35% of heads in the balanced panel reported that PM had helped them 
identify and assist teachers whose workload problems might inhibit their performance. 
 
Table 3. Performance management as a means of supporting teachers:  
Head teacher views, balanced panel. 
PM has helped the school assist those teachers: Wave 2 Wave 3 
 % agree  % agree  
- with difficult or inappropriate workloads.  11 35** 
- whose professional development needs  
are greatest  37 
 
36 
- whose morale was low  18 23 
- who had difficulty motivating their pupils.  12 21* 
 
Change between Wave 2 and Wave 3: statistical significance: ** 1%; * 10% level 
Weighted by sample fractions. Number of observations: balanced panel 103, and in the cross section, wave 2 c. 
415, and wave 3, c. 290. 
c) Selecting the best alternative:  
An important part of integrative negotiation lies in involvement of both parties in selecting the 
best alternative: otherwise it is hardly a negotiation. Teachers were asked about the conduct of 
their own performance reviews. A first test is whether teachers themselves thought the agreed 
priorities reflected the wider objectives of their schools, as in certain key management 
documents, such as the School Development Plan (SDP) (Table 4). They might for example 
have disagreed with the question because they thought the head had imposed some personal 
objectives unrelated to those of the school, or because the teachers were ignorant of the 
school’s objectives. In either case, one would conclude that that the resulting solution was not 
seen by both parties as the ‘best alternative’. Although some of the written-in comments by 
teachers mentioned objectives being imposed on them in their performance reviews, the 
answers to other questions in Table 4 also confirm that around 90% of teachers felt fully 
involved in the process: they had the opportunity to discuss objectives, to influence those 
chosen, and account was taken of their professional needs. Confirming the ‘golden thread’ 
that the government established in the scheme, in the great majority of cases, the performance 
reviews included indicators of pupil progress. On this evidence at least, it would seem that 
teachers were involved in the selection of the best alternative strategies to achieve their 
objectives, and thus participated in the third stage of integrative negotiation.  
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Table 4. Teachers’ reports on the nature of their most recent performance review. 
(balanced panel)  
 
 Wave 2 Wave 3 
 
Reference of individual goals to school goals 
% 
agree 
% 
agree 
Did they relate to the wider objectives of the school (as in SDP or team 
plans)? 
91 89 
Did they include indicators of pupil progress? Na 81 
Teacher influence on goal setting   
Did you have the opportunity to discuss them with your team leader?  96 91+ 
Could you influence the objectives chosen? 92 89 
Did they take account of your professional needs? 79 78 
Evidence of commitment to agreed goals   
Were your objectives clear and measurable? 94 88+ 
Do you understand how they will be monitored and reviewed? 81 87 
Are you in a position to achieve your objectives? 93 87* 
Did you agree your objectives with your team leader? 97 Na 
Significance of change wave 2 to wave 3: * 5%; + 10%. Not every question was asked in both 
waves to minimise the demands placed on respondents. 
 
d) Commitment to implementation: 
The final stage of any integrative negotiation concerns commitment to implementation. A 
necessary part of this is that objectives should be clear and measurable, that there should be 
verifiable criteria of fulfilment, and an understanding of the monitoring procedures. Without 
these, the process could easily become an empty exercise. The overwhelming majority of 
teachers (c. 90%) reported that they had clear and measurable objectives, and a slightly 
smaller percentage said that they understood how progress would be monitored and reviewed, 
and that they were in a position to achieve their objectives (Table 4). They also considered 
their objectives were realistic, and nearly all said they had agreed them. As with choosing 
objectives, so with monitoring, the Education Department gave considerable guidance as to 
how statistical and other evidence could be used to help define and monitor achievement of 
objectives. 
 
Considering these replies at face value, there is a strong case for concluding that integrative 
negotiation is an important component of performance management as it is practiced in many 
schools. Inspection of the written-in comments underlines this, but it also raises some 
questions about the significance of the very high level of positive reports. On the positive 
side, one head teacher wrote: ‘It has helped in the move towards being a self evaluating 
school and to establish the need for more challenging objectives for staff. The previous 
system was “cosy”’, (#30033). In similar vein, another head said: ‘[PM] has made them more 
aware of the need for objective evidence to prove pupil progress’ (#30113). On the negative 
side, some classroom teachers expressed adverse comments, of which one wrote: ‘PM has 
resulted in teachers doing more admin, tasks analysis, statistical work and less time given to 
creating interesting vibrant lessons’, (#20888). 
 
One explanation of such divergent written-in views, apart from their relatively small number 
compared with the main replies, is that head teachers had a somewhat different perception of 
performance management than their classroom teachers. For the former, PM involved use of 
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data and other materials to diagnose problems faced by their schools. For the latter, in schools 
where the message had not been well communicated, statistical data were irrelevant to the 
task of ‘creating interesting vibrant lessons’. One measure of whether PM was mere form-
filling and agreeing a paper exercise lies in the extent to which both head and classroom 
teachers share the view that PM has led to improved goal setting in their schools. Where 
classroom teachers experience PM as a lot of meaningless statistics they are unlikely to have 
been involved in the problem-solving dimension of goal-setting. To this we now turn. 
 
5. Instrumentality of PM in linking classroom teacher and school-wide objectives  
Integrative negotiation requires two parties, and so it is important to demonstrate that the 
schools in which this was best developed were also those in which teachers had greater 
awareness of school objectives. This requires a linking of replies from classroom and head 
teacher. Ideally, we should compute average scores for teacher awareness of objectives in a 
particular school, and then compare these with the judgements of the head teacher on the 
quality of the different stages of integrative negotiation within the performance review 
process. Unfortunately, the response rate across schools was too variable, and so we tackle the 
question the other way round: whether the teachers who said PM had made them personally 
more aware of their school’s objectives were working in schools in which the heads reported 
that PM was effective? Although there appears to have been a considerable improvement in 
the operation of PM between waves 2 and 3, we limit this analysis to wave 2 because it 
contained a wider range of descriptive questions to head teachers about the conduct of 
performance reviews. 
 
To gauge the quality of performance reviews as judged by the head teachers, we conducted a 
factor analysis which boiled eighteen questions down to three dimensions: whether PM had 
led to clearer goals being set; whether objectives were agreed to by teachers in their schools; 
and whether the school provided support, such as for professional development. These three 
indexes were then included in an ordered probit regression on classroom teacher replies as to 
whether their performance review had raised their awareness of school objectives. The latter 
variable included a five point scale from disagree strongly to agree strongly. We also included 
some descriptive questions from the teacher questionnaire relating to aspects of their 
performance reviews, plus a set of control variables. The results are shown in Table 5. 
Although the pseudo r-squared is low, it is statistically significant at the 0.1% level. The 
important conclusion from the table is that when head teachers judge performance 
management to provide clearer goals and, that those goals are agreed, classroom teachers are 
more likely to report that it has increased their awareness of their school’s objectives. 
Likewise, classroom teachers are more likely to find PM increases their goal awareness when 
the performance review is carried out systematically, when there are specific and clear goals, 
their own needs are taken into consideration, and when they see their school using PM to 
inform and to support its teachers. 
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Table 5. Factors raising the awareness of class teachers of their school’s objectives 
Dependent variable: ‘PM has made me more aware of the targets set in the school development plan.’  
(Ordered probit, values from 1, disagree strongly to 5, agree strongly.) 
 Coef. Sign-
ific-
ance 
Std. Err. Variable 
type 
Head teacher policies on PM in their school     
Clearer goals .1346927 ** .0547 Factor 
score 
Objectives agreed .1482757 *** .0388 Factor 
score 
Provision of support .0278599  .0489 Factor 
score 
Teacher views of their latest Performance Review     
Specific objectives set in PR -.3596218 *** .1379 Dummy 
Clear objectives set in PR .1137584  .1214 Dummy 
Objectives related to SDP .3119143 *** .0941 Dummy 
Objectives take account of professional needs .1723101 * .0829 Dummy 
School provides a mentor for applications .1068846  .0764 Dummy 
Teacher eligible for Threshold -.2677386 ** .1178 Dummy 
School uses PM to inform about objectives .4737709 *** .1286 Dummy 
School used PM to assist profession dev .3853758 *** .0998 Dummy 
Significance: *** <1%, ** 2%, * 5%. Robust standard errors used. 
Control variables on teacher and school characteristics included dummies if female, aged over 30, part-time, had 
a degee, union member, secondary school, and number of school pupils. Of these, only ‘secondary school’ was 
significant, at 0.1%, with a coefficient of -0.3. 
Pseudo R2=0.045, prob = 0.000 Wald chi2=158.7, n=1699. Data analysed using STATA 9. Factor analysis of 
head teacher views was based on an analysis of 18 variables on different aspects of PM in their schools. These 
scores have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of unity. The variables were adjusted by setting missing 
values to neutral values to ensure the regression was based on full coverage of the response for wave 2. Total 
teacher response in wave 2: 1792, used replies in regression: 1699. 
 
 
A slightly different angle on the same question is provided by examining the degree to which 
head teachers, the school leadership group and classroom teachers all share the view that PM 
has caused goal setting to become clearer and more effective in their schools. Again the 
motivation for this analysis is that a consistent set of views is much more likely if goal setting 
is being run systematically in a school, and in a spirit of integrative negotiation. If the spirit is 
all ‘take’, or that goals are imposed on teachers, or just that heads have unrealistic views 
about how the process is running in practice in their schools, then one would expect no 
relationship between head, leadership group and classroom teacher views. In the absence of a 
coordinated approach, individual teachers may have good or bad experiences with their 
individual department heads, but these would not be consistent within the same school. On the 
other hand, if there is coordination, one would expect the views of these three groups to 
converge. 
 
We approach this issue by combining a number of questions to head teachers on the 
contribution of PM in their schools to more effective goal setting, and computing an index 
based on a factor analysis, and then tabulating these against classroom teacher judgements 
about goal setting. This provides an indication of the degree to which the two sets of 
judgements coincide (Table 6, Panel A). Being a factor score, the mean is zero and the 
standard deviation is unity, so that roughly two thirds of cases should lie in the range between 
plus and minus one. Thus, a positive score for school ‘x’ indicates that the strength of the 
head’s assessment of goal setting is above the average for schools in the sample. Thus in 
Panel A, we observe that in schools where classroom teachers agree strongly that PM has 
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improved goal setting, the heads’ scores are also above average and in the positive direction 
(at 0.439), indicating a convergence of their views. Conversely, in the schools where the 
teachers judge PM has not improved their awareness of school goals, we observe lower scores 
for the head teacher assessments. Thus, as with the ordered probit analysis, we find evidence 
that, where heads report PM as working effectively, so too do classroom teachers. 
 
 
Table 6. Comparing the effectiveness of PM as seen by head teachers and classroom 
teachers in the same school. 
 
Index of effective goal setting as judged by head teachers. 
 
Panel A: Index related to class teacher views of effects of PM (all classroom teachers 
including those in the leadership group): 
 PM has made me 
more aware of 
school targets 
 
PM has given me 
incentive to work 
beyond job 
requirements 
PM means good 
work now 
rewarded 
PM makes 
managers set 
clearer targets 
Agree strongly .439 .268 .202 .194 
Agree .100 .160 .133 .108 
Disagree .046 .101 .107 .040 
Disagree strongly -.075 .104 .057 -.001 
     
Neutral/no view .214 .118 .088 .143 
 
Panel B: Index related to the leadership group views on the effects of PM on classroom 
teacher performance. 
 
Leadership group 
response (excl head): 
PM makes class teachers 
more aware of school 
targets 
PM promotes better work 
priorities among class 
teachers 
PM increases 
importance of good 
middle-mgt in the 
school 
Agree strongly .402 .300 .181 
Agree .111 .202 .188 
Disagree .105 .127 .095 
Disagree strongly -.359 -.302 -.217 
    
Neutral/no view .210 .054 .131 
Factor scores for better goal setting as judged by head teachers. Cells show factor scores for head teacher replies 
in these schools, waves 2 and 3 combined. Mean zero, standard deviation of unity. 
 
We are able to take this a step further by examining how far both head teachers and the 
leadership group (departmental heads and team leaders) coincide in their assessments of the 
effect of PM on goal setting for classroom teachers (Table 6 Panel B). This is more a measure 
of consistency of view within the managerial hierarchy in schools. One would expect to find 
such consistency in schools in which integrative negotiation is a part of PM, which is shown 
by the rising value of the head teachers’ index as we move towards schools where the 
leadership group has a positive assessment of PM. 
 
Finally, we turn to the relationship between heads’ judgements of the effectiveness of goal 
setting and class teachers’ reports concerning the content and conduct of PM in the same 
schools. As already mentioned, pupil progress has been the litmus test for the government as 
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to whether or not ‘performance’ is real. As can be seen in Table 7, in schools where head 
teachers judge PM to be effective, classroom teachers are more likely to report a continued 
emphasis on pupil progress within PM. Secondly, echoing the element of organisational 
support to teachers where PM has been well-implemented, teachers are more likely to be 
confident that merit will be rewarded – ‘all good teachers’ can expect to progress on the upper 
pay scale. Finally, reflecting the external pressures on school management, it is notable that 
where head teachers report effective goal setting, class teachers report that their school 
actively benchmarks its educational practices on other good-performing schools. 
 
Table 7. Class teacher views of changes to PM 
Class teacher responses  (all classroom teachers) Yes No Neutral 
/no view 
Now less focus on pupil progress in PM .0484 .1819 .0623 
All good teachers can now reach point 3 on UPS .1205 .089 .095 
School looks to education practices of schools higher up 
league tables 
.1259 .0360 .1505 
Cells: head teacher scores of whether PM aids goal setting in their school. All class teachers combined. 
 
6. How many schools have adopted the ‘reformer’ strategy? 
By now it is clear that behind the general picture of growing acceptance and increasing 
positive assessment of PM shown in Table 1, there is considerable diversity in the way in 
which the national scheme has been implemented in individual schools. Thus there would 
seem to be schools where it is quite reasonable to accept the PM has functioned like a process 
of integrative individual-level negotiation, whereas in others, this seems to be far from the 
case. This diversity was reflected in some of the written-in comments. One teacher wrote: 
‘Teachers feel obliged and pressurised into making unrealistic targets at the beginning of the 
year which they then cannot fulfil during the year’ (‘#833 T-W2). On the other hand, one 
head wrote in: ‘PM has improved the positive attitude to professional development and self-
improvement within the overall picture of school improvement’ (#60162 H-W2). 
 
There will clearly be a large grey area of PM practice in between the cases of imposed goals 
and those where there is a real spirit of negotiation. Therefore, a precise allocation of schools 
into one or other category is impossible and any measure has to be taken with a grain of salt. 
As schools change over time, so the manner in which they apply PM may also evolve. 
Therefore it is better to talk of strategies adopted by schools, and which may change, rather 
than to seek to characterise individual schools. Thus, a first strategy, hinted at earlier on is the 
‘reformer’ strategy, where the school seeks to use PM as an opportunity to improve 
management and to use goal setting to improve coordination within the school. On the other 
hand, the ‘fire-fighter’ strategy groups two broad approaches: to use PM to get teachers their 
pay rise, and so reduce staff recruitment and retention problems; and to use PM to impose 
targets on teachers in an attempt to raise performance. Both of these are likely to be driven by 
crises. A school may well switch strategies, from being a ‘fire-fighter’ to being a reformer, for 
example, once retention problems have been resolved, and there is time to move on to other 
issues. 
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Table 8. Percentage of schools with ‘joined-up’ goal setting:  
Schools  in which class teachers respond ‘agree’ given that both head teachers and the 
leadership group agree that PM has improved goal setting in their schools 
 
 PM has led to improved goal setting in my school 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
 % agree % agree % agree % agree 
 Cross section analysis pooled across waves 
Waves 2 & 3 
using pooled 
responses 
28.7 26.5 26.0 15.6 
Schools with a 
complete  set of 
observations 
397 219 273 224 
 Panel analysis using wave-specific responses 
Wave 2 20.4% 27.2 14.3 8.2 
Wave 3 35.8% 38.5 26.8 20.3 
No complete  
obs.  wave 2 
206 81 70 85 
No complete sets 
of obs  wave 3 
137 65 82 74 
Notes: column headings: 
(a) heads and all classroom teachers 
(b) heads and leadership group 
(c) leadership group and non-leader class teachers 
(d) heads, leaders and non-leader class teachers 
The heads’ judgements on goal setting were based on the same index as that used in Tables 6 and 7, 
but taking the median value as dividing positive from negative judgements as to whether PM had 
improved goal setting. The leadership group values relate to those who agreed that PM had improved 
goal setting in their schools, as did the class teacher question. Members of the leadership group were 
identified from the biographical data obtained in the first wave. The number of observations in the 
panel was reduced by the need to have responses from both heads and the relevant group of classroom 
teachers for each school.
9
  
 
 
One way to identify the ‘reformer’ strategy might be to enquire whether goal setting is 
integrated within a school, and in the spirit of the previous discussion, to explore whether 
both classroom and head teachers’ agree PM has improved goal setting in their schools. We 
characterise schools with the ‘reformer’ strategy as those in which head teachers give above 
average scores using the index of goal setting quality in Tables 5 and 6, and where the 
classroom teachers agree it has improved goal setting. On these rough and ready estimates, we 
may characterise between 15% and 25% of schools in the sample as pursuing the ‘reformer’ 
strategy (Table 8). This can be seen in the top row, which uses the largest number of 
observations available by pooling responses for 2001 and 2004. A similar analysis was carried 
out for the other indicator used in the earlier tables, namely, whether PM had increased one’s 
personal awareness of school targets. The effects were somewhat smaller, but so too was the 
number of positive replies to that question. These estimates are consistent with those of early 
case studies by Wragg et al (2001), and by Mahoney et al. (2003), who found modest effects 
of the new system in changing how teachers perform. However, what these early studies 
could not capture is the growth in the number of schools adopting the ‘reformer’ strategy. 
Even though the small numbers of effective observations beckons caution, whichever measure 
is used, there has been an increase of about ten percentage points in such schools: from 10-
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20% in 2001 to 20-30% in 2004. The growth in the numbers of ‘reformer’ schools was 
confirmed by computing a transition matrix between such schools in 2001 and 2004, which 
showed strong movement from ‘fire-fighter’ schools in 2001 into the ‘reformer’ category in 
2004, with only small number of moves in the opposite direction. Thus, one can say that the 
number of schools adopting the ‘reformer’ strategy has increased quite strongly since the 
inception of the new system. 
 
7. School performance 
Finally, we turn to effects of PM on school performance as reflected in the government’s 
league table performance indicators. It is impossible to test whether the new system has led to 
improved pupil results for the whole country because there are too many other factors at 
work. However, it is possible to examine whether the schools which implemented 
performance management most thoroughly achieved greater improvements in their results 
than those which did not. Comparing improvements in goal setting with improvements in 
academic performance over time across schools enables us to factor out many of the possible 
competing variables. It should be added that national tests are externally assessed so that 
although there has been debate about grade inflation across the system as a whole, the scope 
for any individual schools to inflate their grades is small. It is quite likely that using a relative 
measure understates the possible full effect of PM on school performance, but we have no 
simple way of adjusting for the unknown amount of general grade inflation. 
 
To gauge these we take changes in the academic results of schools at Key Stage 2 (age 10) for 
primary schools, and for GCSE
10
 (age 15) for secondary schools (Table 8). We identify those 
schools which improved their relative academic performance as reflected in the results for 
school years ending 1999-2000 and 2002-2003, and compare this group with those reporting 
an improvement in goal setting between waves 2 and 3. The sample numbers of those 
changing between waves 2 and 3 are quite small, so the results can be only tentative, but we 
found a positive and statistically significant relationship: schools whose heads report 
improvements in goal setting were more likely also to have improved their academic results. 
 
Table 8. Goal setting and school performance 
 
(Column %) Improved relative academic performance at school 
Improved use of goal setting in school No Yes 
No 53 40 
Yes 47 60 
   
 Chi^2 3.1 
 P 0.079 
Note:  table shows changes between waves 2 & 3. 
Note:  goal-setting factor score as in Tables 5 and 6. Based on the 169 observations for schools that could be 
matched. 
 
Confidence in these results is boosted by similar findings by researchers at the CMPO, Bristol 
University, using a completely different methodology, which show a positive effect of 
threshold assessment on the academic performance of pupils in classes taught by eligible 
teachers (Atkinson et al. 2004). The CMPO study examines the change in academic 
achievements of pupils in classes taught by teachers who were, or were not, eligible to pass 
the Threshold. They found that pupils with teachers eligible to pass the Threshold were more 
likely to improve their performance. Although the CMPO study emphasises the financial 
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incentive of passing the threshold, their evidence is consistent with this paper. Their statistical 
results could equally well derive from improved goal-setting as opposed to simple financial 
incentive. Although the findings of our own study suggest that most teachers are not strongly 
motivated by the extra financial rewards offered, it is clear that going through the threshold 
application procedures would make them more amenable to focusing on the goals agreed with 
their head teachers. 
 
8. Conclusions  
This paper has shown that despite initial academic scepticism and the hostility of many 
teachers and their unions, performance management had, by 2004, taken root in many state 
schools in England, and was contributing to improved goal setting. Although such schools 
were still in the minority by 2004, in those where PM had become well established, it had also 
contributed to improved pupil performance. The reason the initial academic scepticism was 
misplaced was that insufficient account was taken of how the problems of performance 
definition and monitoring could be resolved by appropriate goal-setting measures. This 
suggests that if we are take up Prendergast’s challenge to look at performance incentives 
across a wider range of occupations, we need to give more consideration to mechanisms for 
defining and agreeing performance goals. 
 
Although some of the leading exponents of goal setting theory have systematically 
downplayed the importance of financial incentives (e.g. Locke and Latham, 1990), they have 
assumed a key supporting role in the teachers’ case. For teachers, the link with pay has been 
of central importance. At one level, it was the ‘bribe’ to gain acceptance for the new system: 
no performance management, no large pay increase. But there is also a sense in which it has 
functioned as performance related pay, and so contributed to the negotiation between school 
management and classroom teachers. Heads can decide who to put forward for the Threshold 
assessment, and they can choose when to propose their colleagues for movement along the 
upper pay scale. The evidence from a teacher’s performance review is one of the key items in 
the submissions for pay progression. Up until the time of the latest wave, in practice, and ex 
post, success rates at the Threshold and for upper pay scale progression have been very high, 
and some have argued it is virtually automatic. However, this is to miss the power heads have 
to advance or postpone proposals for upper pay scale advancement, and the impact of the 
long-running uncertainty over central government funding for performance increases. Ex post 
the pass rates may be high, but ex ante, in the eyes of most teachers and their heads, according 
to the evidence of the CEP surveys, the outcome is uncertain. It is surely the ex ante prospect 
that drives behaviour rather than the ex post knowledge. 
 
The link with pay introduces another element, namely that of negotiation. It has been argued 
in this paper that an appropriate framework for considering the effective cases of goal setting 
within PM is that of integrative negotiation. The rates of pay are fixed by national pay scales, 
and schools are constrained by Education Department rules as to how they allocate their 
budgets. Nevertheless, putting a teacher forward for the Threshold or for upper pay scale 
progression earlier rather than later is one of the measures of organisational support available 
to head teachers when trying to work out solutions to the kind of problems that are the focus 
of PM: alignment of individual and collective goals, and renegotiating work priorities. Walton 
and McKersie were careful to retain a reference to the parties’ utility functions within their 
analysis of integrative bargaining. Problem-solving has perhaps always a technical 
component, but the chosen solution nearly always also affects the welfare of both parties. 
Putting a teacher forward for progression is one of the elements of support alongside 
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professional development, and adjustment of inappropriate workloads that can be used to help 
persuade individual teachers to adjust their work priorities to those needed by their schools. 
 
Could this be achieved without the link with pay? A previous Conservative government 
introduced a national teacher appraisal scheme in 1991, yet it was not widely implemented in 
practice (Ofsted, 1996), and what was left of it was replaced in 2000. In contrast, PM has 
been almost universally implemented, and as shown in the CEP surveys, its design in most 
schools, as concerns written objectives and so on, follows the key Education Department’s 
guidelines. Although it is difficult to probe in this survey, there are signs of important 
differences between the ‘fire-fighter’ schools which have just used PM as a form-filling 
exercise to get teachers their pay increase, and the ‘reformer’ schools. The former dissociated 
the two processes, and have paid the price as PM appears to have been less effective than in 
the ‘reformer’ schools, and arguably less beneficial in terms of pupil attainments. 
 
One piece of evidence that would have helped to clinch the argument about changing 
priorities and practices by classroom teachers as a result of PM was lost in the course of the 
survey. It had been hoped to track how teachers allocated their discretionary time, this being 
considered a better measure than questions about changes of priorities and practices. 
Unfortunately for the study, measurement of this variable was disturbed by conflicts over 
teachers’ working hours, and government action to ‘remodel’ teachers’ working time. It also 
proved impossible to capture teachers’ working time use at the same point in the school year 
while at the same time surveying attitudes at the same point in the performance management 
cycle. As a result, there proved to be too much ‘noise’ in this key variable. Nevertheless, we 
know from the replies of head teachers that many of them have shifted resources and teaching 
priorities towards more academic and test subjects in response to league table pressures, and 
these are more likely to include ‘reformer’ schools. With this, the good practice examples of 
performance reviews, and the evidence of improved pupil attainments in ‘reformer’ schools, 
we can infer that many teachers have adjusted their work priorities as a result of performance 
management where it has been well run. 
 
By the time of the last wave in 2004, it was clear that effective performance management was 
spreading as a result of more schools adopting a systematic approach rather than diffusing 
evenly by the same amount across all schools. Hence the interest in identifying those with the 
‘fire-fighter’ and ‘reformer’ strategies, and tracking those that switch. Adopting the ‘reformer’ 
strategy opens up not just a one-off change in performance for the school, but rather provides 
it with the means of addressing continuously changing priorities. Professional groups may 
bring a high degree of motivation by virtue of their professional ethos, but that can also prove 
conservative in the face of such changes. The cases of systematic performance management 
suggest that by approaching goal setting as a form of integrative negotiation, a way is opened 
to addressing changing school priorities on a long-term basis. Recognising this is important, 
because professional groups, such as teachers, bring expert knowledge to their work that is 
not always accessible to management. Even when the manager is another teacher, there may 
be differences in subject knowledge and teaching methods, so that it is hard to identify and 
impose top down new objectives and the strategies to achieve them. Approaching the process 
as one of integrative negotiation enables both parties to engage in a dialogue on their 
respective objectives, the means to achieve them, and the measures of organisational support 
needed. In such cases, agreement to goals is arguably the more appropriate means of gaining 
commitment to fulfil them. 
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10. Endnotes 
 
                                                 
1
 . We acknowledge the financial support of the Leverhulme Foundation Future of Unions project, the ESRC, 
and STICERD. We also wish to thank the teachers’ unions, the Education Department, and all the classroom and 
head teachers whose support and comments have made this study possible. We also wish to thank the 
participants at the 2006 LERA conference, and the referees for their valuable comments. We should also like to 
thank our colleagues at CEP for their generous comments, and Maria Koumenta and Ettore Ricciardi for their 
invaluable research assistance in preparing the data on school performance. Thanks also for comments given by 
colleagues at the CEP Tuesday workshop, and the CIPD Professional Standards Conference, 2005. 
 
2
 We are indebted to Shushi Okazaki of the Akahata newspaper for information about schools in Japan. 
 
3
 The advertising slogan was used by the government’s Teacher Training Agency in the early 2000s. 
 
4
  We are indebted to Mike Chapman, former head of Cambridge Educational Associates, for first drawing our 
attention to the different ways in which schools were approaching the new system.. The CEA was in charge of 
the system of schools’ external advisors for the first wave of threshold assessments. 
 
5
. Data for schools in Wales were not included in this analysis. 
  
6
. This is described in Marsden and Belfield (2005a). 
 
7
.  Respondent #622 Classroom teacher-Wave 1. 
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8
 Team leaders are classroom teachers exercising middle management responsibilities. 
 
9
. Although we had information from 424 schools for the balanced panel analysis, this yielded only 
214 in wave 2 and 139 in wave 3 with information on the head’s assessment of improved goal setting. 
The numbers of schools with a complete set of observations dropped further when tabulating these 
replies against those of classroom and leadership group teacher. This will tend to eliminate smaller 
schools disproportionately. Results are unweighted and do not correct for over-sampling of secondary 
schools. 
 
10
 General Certificate of Secondary Education. 
 1 
 
 
 
11. Appendix 1: Sample design and questionnaire. 
 
The questionnaire was developed in close consultation with the teachers’ unions and the 
Department for Education and Skills, and piloted on groups of lay representatives. For the first 
wave, a random sample of 1,675 schools was drawn from the Register of Educational 
Establishments for England and a similar register for Wales, and packages of questionnaires were 
sent to head teachers. Heads received a covering letter explaining the nature of the study, that it had 
the support of the head teachers’ associations, and that it had been developed in consultation with 
the teachers’ unions and the DfEE. They were asked to distribute the questionnaires. In small 
schools with under 35 teachers, every teacher was sent a questionnaire, and in larger ones, heads 
were asked to select every nth teacher off the school’s staff list depending on the size of the school. 
Heads were asked to complete a special questionnaire. Being a panel study, the initial respondents 
to wave one were approached again for waves two and three. 
 
The overall response rate to the first wave was about 20%, which comprises a double response: 
whether the head teacher agreed to distribute the questionnaires in the first place, and then whether 
the teachers themselves chose to reply. In many schools, head teachers have a policy of not 
distributing questionnaires in their schools in order not to add to the workload on their teachers. 
 
Initially, the panel included replies from about 4,000 teachers and about 1,000 heads. Accounting 
for sample attrition, it is possible to link replies from about 1,000 teachers and about 300 heads over 
time through the panel. We conducted a number of checks to see whether the panel results reported 
here differ statistically significantly from the simple cross-section results for each wave, and found 
that on the whole they do not. 
 
The questionnaire used for classroom teachers and for head teachers in Wave 3 can be found in 
Marsden and Belfield (2005b). That for wave 1 can be found in Marsden (2000).  
 
